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This article examines the urban regime ill Detroit, Michigan,
specifically examining how the regime makes decisions about
redevelopment and major capital projects. Detroit's urban regime,
which emergedfrom the urban unrest of the 1960s, mobilizes resources,
promotes cooperation, and manages conflicts between public and private
interests to facilitate and justify redevelopment. Although political
decision makers are represented in the regime, we argue that the
business community's influence is pervasive, visible. and
overwhelming. The participants in Detroit's regime are more
adversarial and disrespectful of local political entities than regimes
previously studied. Regimes may warp democratic processes to
accommodate business interests because the financial decisions of
economic institutions reverberate throughout the local political
economy.
Since the publication of Peterson's City Limits, urbanists have debated his
contention that cities are constrained not only by the necessity of economic
competition but by the limits of resources primarily provided by their land area.
Because of limited policy options and limited economic resources, Peterson
(1981) argues that a city acts as a unitary interest, claiming to act for the city as
a whole, when approaching land use decisions.
. . ··In the development.ofregime theor:yi~StQRe:~1989;..1.9.g1.a;.']'981b) counters
Peterson's conclusion and argues convincingly that cities cannor and do not
function as unitary interests when approaching land use decisions. Rather than
suggesting a unitary ideological front, Stone argues that land use decisions
pervade urban political conflict. Stone's definition of a regime identifies
informal arrangements between city hall and the downtown business elite. An
urban regime is defined as "the informal arrangements by which public bodies
and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out
governing decisions" (Stone, 1989:6). This informal partnership and the way it
operates constitute the city's regime and enable public and private interests to
manage conflicts, mobilize resources and promote cooperation (Stone, 1989: I).
Recent research (Clarke and Gaile, 1992) suggests that these informal
arrangements are actually a reflection of a shift in policy orientation in which
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market feasibility supersedes social criteria, downtown becomes the locus for
redevelopment, and the city's role as a redeveloper is redefined. Such an
orientation is evident in Detroit, the focus of this study.
The historical literature on community power developed from the debate
between elitists (Mills, 1956; Hunter, 1959; Banfield, 1961) and pluralists
~Truma~, 1951; Dahl, 1961). Both arguments focus primarily on social and
Ideolo~lcal control rather than the systemic and hegemonic perspectives offered
by reg~me. theory. T~at th~ .bu~iness community in Detroit, Atlanta, or any
other city Influences CIty politics IS not a remarkable observation. However, this
stud.y of Detroit's re~ime explicate~ an~ highlights regime theory by illustrating
~he informal, perv~slve, and evolving Impact of the business community. The
informal relationships are not neutral; they are probusiness. Many demands are
ma~e ~f city ?ffici~ls by a variety of groups and individuals but few groups
maintam consistent Influence. This fragmentation provides fertile ground for a
regime. "Community power," Stone concludes, "accrues to those with a
capacity t~ act in what is an otherwise diffuse system of authority" (1989:230).
The Detroit case illustrates how this capacity to act is orchestrated.
Analysis of structural factors offers additional insights into how land use
decisio~s. are made, Elkin (1987a) stresses the importance of understanding the
C?~posltlon of t~e. urban regime, the structural factors that define the powers of
Cities and how cures relate to holders of economic assets. Like others Elkin
divide~ .labor between. th~se who priv~tely control capital or assets and city
authorities. The orgamzauon of the regime, marked by this division of labor, is
int1.uenced by internal prerogatives and organization. The larger urban, state, and
national and international political and economic environment also have an
impact on the regime. 1
In his claim that the political ruling class does not control the state, Block
(1977) argues that the state rationalizes capitalism. Those who manage the state
ap~aratus depend on healthy economic activity to maintain support for the
regime and will attempt to facilitate and encourage private investment in order to
maintain or in~r~ase .economic activity. Policies such as property lax
~balemenls, s~bsldlzed Interest rates and economic development corporations are
~ _ ue. ~~ the ge,neral ,Interest of capital and the political interest of the regime.
~... Debates oil constraints, 'arguments ibiiu('the 'political nature of (hoe 'urban-
sce?e, and attempts to explain the configuration of decision making groups or
regimes frame much of the current discussion of urban political economies.
Logan and Molotch's (1987) theory of the city as a growth machine is
particularly interesting when applied to Detroit, but that discussion is separate
from our analysis of the regime (see Hall and McIntyre Hall, 1994). In the
I. A helpful, but by no means comprehensive list of research on urban decision-
making and urban regimes includes Stone, 1989; Darden, Hill, Thomas, and
Thomas, 1987; Elkin, 1987b; Stone and Sanders, 1987; Slone, 1987a; and
Jones and Bachelor, 1986.
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primary growth machine literature, Logan and Molotch assign a use value and an
exchange value to any given piece of land. Use values reflect residential
concerns while the exchange value stems from rent or income generated from the
property: The value of land is less in distressed cities for either use or exchange.
b~t ~eepln~ the land-based economic elites and their resources on city ground is
critically Important to local governments. The regime is comprised of
competing actors who want land use and capital investment to intensify.
We disagree with Peterson's assessment of the city as a unified interest. The
goal of economic growth may be shared by regime members but the path to
growth is acrimonious and littered with the self-centered demands of economic
elites. Stone defends Atlanta's regime as one created by purposive choices made
before World War II in which the white business elite and elements of the black
middle class began to shape arrangements that were mutually beneficial.
Although the influence of the auto industry pervaded Detroit by the 1920s~ the
current governing coalition emerged from the urban unrest of the sixties. The
Detroit regime is much more adversarial and much more short-sighted than
Atlanta's regime. Elkin argues that urban governments should be public-spirited
and structured to include strong neighborhood associations with significant
power, citywide referenda, and city legislatures with significant powers
(1987a: 171). We find a regime making decisions in Detroit while basically
ignoring neighborhoods and co-opting an impotent city council. There is little
of the public spirit found in either Atlanta or Elkin's model. Our contribution to
the regime literature is to illumine a regime which is contentious and self-
centered while pervading land use decisions in Detroit.
A study of Detroit's regime offers an opportunity to apply regime theory to
a city that is significantly different from Dallas (Elkin, 1987b) and Atlanta
(Stone, 1989). As Elkin finds in Dallas and Stone finds in Atlanta, we find
evidence in Detroit that political debate can occur and the business community's
influence is not subtle.2 Detroit is older and more populous, a blue-collar,
union town where the auto industry has been the dominant economic force for
most of this century. Atlanta, a city with less than half the population of
Detroit, has enjoyed relative economic health and benefitted from a diverse
.. -eeonerny.-Inconeast-Detroit's fortunes have been clearly tied to-flueteationsis
the auto industry for decades. The collapse of the domestic auto industry
contributes significantly to Detroit's current malaise. Dallas, a relatively new
city with nearly the same population as Detroit, has been influenced by the
boom-bust cycle in domestic oil prices and the savings and loan industry.
However, diversification and the federal bailout of failed thrifts has shielded it
2. See Stone (1989) for a clear picture of the evolution of Atlanta's regime.
Elkin (1987b) analyzes the regime in Dallas; and his seminal work (1987a)
on cities and regimes was most illuminating to our work on Detroit.
Eisinger (1980) offers a clear comparison of the emergence of black political
power in Detroit and Atlanta.
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3. The 1980 population of Detroit was 1.2 million and 1.03 million in 1990.
Atlanta's census found 425,022 residents in 1980 and 394,017 in 1990.
Dallas had 904,078 residents in 1980 and just over one million in 1990.
4. See Ewen, 1978, for an historical view of the power structure in Detroit.
from the vulnerability inherent in Detroit's dependence on the auto industry
(Fasenfest, 1986; Jones and Bachelor, 1986). Dallas is the only one of the three
cities whose population grew between 1980 and 1990 and is projected to
continue growth into the next decade.3
Our purpose here is to examine two decisions heavily influenced by
Detroit's urban regime. The first was a decision to clear a site so that General
Motors would build an assembly plant in the city, the Central Industrial Park
Project (CIPP). The other decision was to facilitate a neighborhood
redevelopment project around the General Motors (GM) world headquarters
complex, the New Center Area. We will examine the regime by discussing what
the political and economic actors bring to the bargaining table, and evaluating
the regime's role in redevelopment decisions in Detroit.
Business confidence - the traditional capitalist's evaluation of the general
political and economic climate - is particularly low in Detroit. In such an
environment, it is logical for the regime to marshall whatever resources are
available to improve business confidence. Because the regime can fall if
economic activity decreases the political .leaders purport to be trapped between
Scylla and Charybdis: politicians must make economic development decisions
which benefit corporate and commercial interests or fall. Lindblom (1988)
argues that political decision makers may warp democracy to devise policy which
accommodates business interests because of the potential impact economic
institutions have on the market (local and wider), on governments, and even on
the public (1988). In even narrower parameters, the Detroit political
administration must respond to demands from the auto industry as a single
investment decision. If GM or Chrysler threaten to move a facility from Detroit
they can paralyze or weaken the political position of the mayor and his
administration.
Fasenfest (1986) posits that antecedent processes may structurally favor one
set of possible outcomes over another set. He argues that Emmett Moten,
director ,Qf... D0tfgiCs-.~CQ.mmug-iLy- end. Economic Development Department...
(CEDD), stacked the deck for General Motors, limiting the city's options to a
range of outcomes which benefiuedOM as a corporate entity.4
From a less marxist but still structural viewpoint, Jones and Bachelor
(1986) propose the terrn sectarchy to describe power in Detroit. They contend
that political power is based in the sectoral organization of the political
economy. Various business, labor, and political leaders occupy key
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organizational positions in forums where major decisions are made. While
particular members may change, the key positions in the regime are fairly
constant over time. Urban decisions involving allocational policies within the
governmental sector tend toward pluralistic decision making. It is wben sectors
meet to decide on costly redevelopment projects, that more elitist bargaining
takes place. Bargaining proceeds, but often in the shadow of an implied threat
from economic elites that they will simply withdraw capital from the city if
their needs are not addressed or if their demands are not met.
The influence of the downtown business elite on political decisions is
crucial to understanding Detroit's regime. The current regime evolved through
the formation of three organizations, all of which involved public officials but
remained under private control. Following the urban riots in 1967, a pioneering
coalition of African Americans, labor, government, and business leaders called
New Detroit was assembled to study neighborhood needs and facilitate public-
private partnerships to fund development in black neighborhoods and involving
minority businesses. While New Detroit has evolved into an advocacy and
lobbying group, it is significant in the emergence of Detroit's regime for two
reasons. First, the leadership of New Detroit has been African American. and the
organization provides a podium 'for those who may not be included in the
regime. Second, in a city that is now 76% black, New Detroit visibly focuses
on African-American neighborhoods and minority-owned businesses.
A second and more business oriented coalition called Detroit Renaissance
emerged by 1971. Auto industry leaders joined financiers and developers to
represent the interests of the elite business community in development,
particularly in the downtown area. The group concluded that a major
development project along Detroit's riverfront was needed to change the image of
downtown and provide a catalyst for the renewal of the central city. Construction
began in 1973 on the Renaissance Center, a hotel, office, and commercial project
financed by an elaborate partnership assembled by Henry Ford II. Ford Motor
,-", Company Jeased.several.Iloors and R1Q¥e~jluodr.eds ..Q:t:~eJl1ployees into RenCen
offices. However, cost overruns, Ford employee resistance to working in Detroit,
and high rates of commercial vacancy led to bankruptcy for the project by 1982.
Although Detroit Renaissance continues to focus on downtown
development, the third and most significant component of the regime was formed
in 1978. Enabled by Michigan's Economic Development Corporation Act
(Public Act 1974, 338), Detroit established an Economic Development
Corporation (EDC). EDCs are charged with sponsoring programs to alleviate
and prevent unemployment and to encourage industrial and commercial
development. Powers of EDCs include acquiring land for project sites. making
loans or issuing bonds to finance projects, constructing facilities and selling or
leasing the project to a commercial or industrial interest. The act transfers
public policy making responsibilities to the EDe, primarily a private sector
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The term "economic downturn" takes on a whole new meaning when used in
Detroit. Despite infusions of federal and state money, the economic health of
Detroit worsens. Population decline that began in the fifties accelerated in the
late sixties and continues; in thirty years, the city lost thirty-five percent of its
5. For an additional perspective on Detroit, see June Manning Thomas, (1989).
6. For a perspective critical of the Central Industrial Park Project, see Wylie,
(1989).
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enterprise. and formalizes its place in the regime (Squires. 1989; Levine. 1989). i residents. Between 1950 and 1980. the number of Detroiters employed in
The membership of Detroit's EDC is comprised of at least nine city officials and manufacturing jobs dropped sixty-eight percent. Economic repons show that
business people. In 1981, the members of the Board of Directors, which the metropolitan industrial investment targeted to Detroit fell from fony-four percent
mayor chairs, were an attorney from a major downtown law firm, GM's real in 1958 to twenty-two percent in 1977. Nearly fifty percent of Detroit's
estate property manager, the president of Detroit Renaissance, two commercial manufacturing jobs disappeared. Commercial disinvestment during the same
executives, a bank vice-president, a city councilmember, and the director of the years was catastrophic, culminating with the 1983 closing of the downtown
city's Community and Economic Development Department (Bruhn, 1991). Hudson's department store. By 1980, unemployment in the city was fifteen
Labor, neighborhoods, and small businesses were not represented on the board. percent (more than fifty percent for young black men), violent crime was on the
While the faces have changed, the source of board members remains basically increase, and major industrial employers were posting losses and laying off
unchanged through 1991. employees. One-third of the city's adults had no earned income, sixty percent
The Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (DEGC), the industrial received some form of public assistance, capital was fleeing the city. and puhlic
redevelopment specialists in the EDC, wields tremendous influence over the services were dramatically curtailed.
selection of the city's development projecls.5 Currently, the executive In 1991, the overall unemployment rate had increased slightly from 1980
committee of the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation has eighteen members: estimates. While employment opportunities exist in suburban areas many
sixteen corporate executives, one officer of the statewide AFL-CIO, and Mayor Detroiters lack transportation. The city government had a $58 billion deficit in
Coleman Young (DEGC, 1991). During the years the DEGC was headed by the the 1991 budget year which had to beerased by further cuts in city services and
Chair of the Board of GM, the group sponsored the two projects discussed in this expenditures. More than fifty percent of students who enter ninth grade in the
article, the Central Industrial Park Project and the New Center Area.6 Detroit public schools never complete high school.
Some observers suggest that a glance at Detroit's riverfront skyline reveals While the city imploded, the opposite occurred in Detroit's suburbs.
who really wields power over development and illumines the inherently inferior Detroit's suburbs are functionally autonomous and politically isolated from the
position of public officials in economic redevelopment. One sees Riverfront city. This isolation can be attributed to several circumstances ranging from the
West (a federally subsidized high rise, high rent apartment complex built and white flight which began in the early sixties to the 1967 urban riots to Mayor
owned by two major developers) [Detroit Mayor] Coleman Young's Joe Louis Coleman Young's overt hostility toward suburban communities. Residents and
Arena and Cobo Hall, Henry Ford's Renaissance Center, Stroh's River Place (an businesses who could do so physically abandoned Detroit although many
apartment and entertainment project) and ANR's Harborside (a chic commercial continued to rely on the city for manufacturing jobs and customers. Shopping
and residential development owned by ANR, a natural gas pipeline and outlets also moved out of the city; in 1958, there were ten major shopping areas
exploration holding company) (Squires, 1989; Darden, et. al., 1987). City in the city and ten in the suburbs. By 1-985,one major shopping mall remained
Councilmember Mel Ravitz observes, "There is [a] tale of two cities in Detroit, in Detroit while nineteen suburban shopping areas controlled ninety-two percent
one city along the river being built; the other consisting of the neighborhoods of the area's retail trade (Darden, et. al ... 1987).
where a million people live, being slowly eroded, neglected, destroyed" (Ravitz, Since the inception of the automobile industry, prosperity in Detroit has
i988:21). Neighborhood decline persisted through periods of activist urban I been tied to that industry. The auto industry had been sliding into difficulty in
policy such as the Model Cities Program, exacerbated by white night, the I the se,:ent~es but experien~ed a preci~itous decline in 19.80. A glo~al
"mailing!' ·of the ·area, and· the exodus of-much of the tax -base. -.", ,".. ,.'..... --- .~. ~ .... '" .:"''''- reorgaruzaaon strategy, headlined by massive work force reductions. sent major .--.;
shock waves through the auto industry (Smith and Feagin, 1987). In 1978,
there were 735,000 hourly workers, a number reduced to 565,000 by 1984; tens
of thousands of workers in supplier industries also lost their jobs. With more
than half of Detroit's workers employed in auto or auto related industries, the
impact was immediate and devastating. General Motors, Ford Motor Company,
and Chrysler Corporation reported plummeting profits: Ford and Chrysler
experienced several quarters with after-tax losses and GM its first annual net loss
since 1921. GM announced that it planned to close two assembly plants in
Detroit, plants where 15,000 auto workers assembled slow-selling luxury cars.
Four additional Detroit area plants were slated for closing in 1982 and GM
announced intentions to build four facilities in Mexico.
15· - .
24 25
-f
t
i
:J
Mid-American Review of Sociology
In 1973, Coleman Young emerged through the United Auto Workers union -
and was elected mayor. Until the 1989 election, which he won with his
narrowest margin of victory ever, Young's electoral strength was overwhelming,
enabling him to dominate the City Council. Only recently has the Council
maintained the needed votes to override any of Young's legislative initiatives and
even then disagreement has been slight. How has Young maintained such
electoral strength? Is he, as some critics claim, a marionette mayor whose
strings are pulled by the business community or is he an assertive leader who
parlays private investment into the common good? Young occupies a key
position in the regime as mayor of the city. At the regime level he provides
administrative and political clearance for privately sponsored economic
development. Concurrently, he is the political leader of a city in which powerful
African American groups support him because he has been their advocate for two
decades. Many neighborhoods support him because of his political savvy in the
dispensation of patronage and neighborhood improvement funds and because of
theenduring support from most of the African American clergy.
Detroit has a strong mayor-weak council form of government bolstered in
the last two decades by Young's invincibility at the polls. Until the last two
mayoral elections Young ran with only token opposition and even with more
serious opponents, Young received more than fifty-five percent of the vote.
There are informal slates for City Council elections endorsed by the mayor and
made known to neighborhood leaders, the African-American clergy, and local
party officials (and actually secret from no one). Coveted UAW endorsements for
City Council elections are overtly influenced by Young, and "being on the slate"
or receiving the UAW's endorsement makes one more electable - but beholden
to the mayor. Throughout the last decade, Young has maintained a million dollar
"war chest" to fund his re-election campaigns and to assist the slate. Council
membership has been mostly minority, Democratic, and fiercely loyal to
Coleman Young. In addition to the support he receives from City Council,
Young has surrounded himself with articulate and loyal administrators. He
appoints the director and top assistants in each city department, and they serve at
his pleasure. .
During the Carter administration Young and his Community and Economic
" .. ,- .~. Developnrenr-Departrrremr- bolstered by the Detroit Economic -Growth
Corporation, secured millions of federal dollars for development primarily
through the Community Development Block Grant (CDBO) and the Urban
Development Action Grant (UDAG) program. Between FY75, when the CDBa
allocations began and FY91, Detroit received nearly $850 million, earmarked by
Congress to benefit low and moderate income areas. In spite of this federal
mandate that COBG funds should benefit low and moderate income people, all of
the riverfront developments listed above (except the RenCen) and the two GM
projects discussed were funded in part with CDBG funds. Mayor Young and the
City Council have offered with impunity every available incentive to businesses
and corporations willing to stay or expand in Detroit. Until his untimely death
in 1988, Councilmember Ken Cockrel, a self-avowed Marxist, made vociferous
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arguments that some quid pro quo (for instance, a guaranteed number of jobs,
commitment to stay x years, accept less than the maximum tax abatement)
between the City and businesses was appropriate, but his position was hardly
given a serious hearing. Councilmember Mel Ravitz proposed an ordinance in
1991 that would have mandated contractual commitments between businesses
and the city when an abatement is granted, but the Council defeated the measure
(Ravitz, 1992).
Legislation allowing Michigan cities to exempt industrial and commercial
facilities from real and personal property taxes for up to twelve years was passed
in 1974 (Public Act 198). Recommendations for tax abatements are presented to
City Council by the Community and Economic Development Department in
conjunction with a review and approval by the Detroit Economic Growth
Corporation. The Detroit City Council passed the first abatement resolution in
1975 and followed it with 326 additional project abatements by 1986. Each
resolution was approved at the maximum of a fifty percent abatement of real and
property taxes for the full twelve years allowed. Until very recently, city
authorities gave economic benefits and bonuses to businesses and only asked that
they stay in town for the time being. No conditions have ever been placed on a
company which accepted land, a property tax abatement, a low interest loan, or a
grant from the City (Ravitz, 1988, 1992; Bruhn, 1991).7
In addition to local incentives, the CEDD sponsored Urban Development
Action Grants, a federally funded program (now nearly defunct) designed to
facilitate development by providing public matching funds for private
expenditures. Detroit received forty-one UDAGs between 1981 and 1987.
totaling $139 million; the concomitant private development approaches $2.8
billion.
Detroit is mired in an "edifice complex" and a corporate oriented approach to
development. Neither posture has led to an improvement in urban poverty levels
or stopped neighborhood decline. Levine suggests that public-private
partnerships typically involve three components, all of which are present in
Detroit: financial inducements, quasi-public redevelopment corporations, and an
entrepreneurial mayor (Shearer, 1989; Levine, 1989). Mayor Young overtly
- courts' the- business community; 'encourages: and-relies on the DEGC, and
facilitates the packaging of redevelopment options for the private sector.
Many economic resources that come to or are solicited by Detroit's
development administrators are earmarked for downtown redevelopment projects.
Even the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), designed to improve
housing and develop neighborhoods, has been part of Young's package. Between
7. In early 1992, the Detroit City Council, for the first time, rescinded a tax
abatement. The Pepsi-Cola Company was granted the full abatement and
promised to provide 800 new jobs, most earmarked for city residents. When
the finished project produced barely 200 new jobs, Council acted. Pepsi's
appeal is in court.
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1975 and 1982, fifty-two percent of the block grant allocations went to projects 1;
in the central business district, the riverfront, and the Woodward Corridor (which:
includes the New Center Area) (Thomas, 1989: 189). CDBG funds since 1982 are' ~
either directly allocated to or held as collateral for the Central Industrial Park I
Project. j
It is not always true that urban political leaders so clearly curry the favor of !:
the business elites. There are several examples from Boston and Chicago where
avowed progressive mayoral candidates attempted to reshape public-private
partnerships more equitably. In these cities, downtown development is linked to
building low-income housing, local officials pursue financial rewards to offset
public risks, and neighborhoods outside the central business district benefit from
redevelopment. Officials in these cities facilitate public-private partnerships, and"
they have diligently attempted to equalize the partners (Stone, 1987b).
1'.
U
The economic existence of the city of Detroit is so precarious that the loss t
of any manufacturing facility sends cataclysmic shudders through both- f.,_:
administrative and legislative hallways. When GM offered Detroit the chance to' t
prepare a site for a new assembly plant the offer was significant for two reasons. t
OM claimed that the new facility would employ 6,000 United Auto Workers. !~:
when it opened. Second, securing the project for Detroit was symbolically
important. The new plant would mean investment by GM in Detroit: not just t.:
jobs but an economic linchpin for the city. With an air of triumph that Mayor ."
Coleman Young joined GM chair Thomas Murphy in June of 1980 to announce f
that a new $500 million Cadillac plant would be built in Detroit. The proposed' .'
site included a vacant Dodge assembly plant and the northern third of the f
Poletown neighborhood. "There is," said Mayor Young, "a state of emergency i._,.·.·_..•.
within the city and bold, far-reaching and innovative initiatives, beginning with "
the city's Centra) Industrial Park Project (CIPP), must be undertaken i~'
immediately to deal with the foundations of this crisis" (Wylie, 1989:48). .
This bold initiative required that the city, using an expedited eminent.
domain law would have to take .ritle to.and clear lTo-400r-h~moes".. l44_ businesses, .1
and sixteen churches in Poletown. The city would have to pay property owners r
a fair market rate plus relocation costs, clear the land, and meet environmental i-
guidelines for clearing toxic wastes. GM also requested and received a twelve-. r
year, fifty percent property tax abatement on the site which represents $60 r
million in lost revenue to the city. The original estimated public contribution I
was $200 million for land acquisition, relocation, demolition, and site I
improvement.8 What pressures were brought to bear on government decision I
I
8. A substantial portion of this amount was taken from Community, '
Development Block Grant funds both as outright expenditures and loans
against future CDBG entitlements. Other revenue sources included UDAGs, I
l
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makers and the public to commit such sums? Symbolically, General Motors
contended that the government's taxation and trade policies were partly to blame
for the demise of the auto industry, therefore government should fa~iljtate the
CIPP. GM also exerted control over site determination, and corporate planners
rejected outright eight of nine alternative sites proposed by CEDD. several of
which involved much less displacement while claiming they were being good
neighbors by providing needed jobs (Cunningham, 1989; Wylie. 1989).
Finally, GM officials clearly stated that if Detroit chose not to meet their needs.
the company would simply build the plant somewhere else (Bruhn, 1991; Wylie,
1989; Jones and Bachelor, 1986; Corsetti, et.al., 1983).
No doubt, Peterson would hear Mayor Young's assessment that ... "this
[Central Industrial Park] project is the best thing to happen to the City of
Detroit in a long time .;" (Corsetti, et. al., 1983) and find evidence of the city as
a unitary interest. The suggestion could also be made that the decision to fund
the CIPP was consensual and closed to the public until technical and political
feasibility was assured. Coleman Young's reputation as a fighter for Detroit
was, at least in some circles, enhanced.
In response to a suit brought by the Poletown Neighborhood Council, the
majority opinion indicated that five of the seven justices were convinced that the
city provided evidence of economic distress and the lack of other adequate sites
for the Poletown plant. The Court went on to say, "In this case the benefit to be
received by the municipality...is sufficient to satisfy this court, The benefit to a
private interest is merely incidental (Poletown Neighborhood Council v, City of
Detroit). Although two dissenting justices vehemently contended that public
funds were being used for a private project, the Court acted in record time,
allowing the city to meet GM's deadline and proceed with the CIPP.
However, Stone argues that, even with a policy such as funding the CIPP,
people may differ in the opinions about the impact of the policy. What one sees
depends on where one stands: with city officials, with the Poletown
Neighborhood Council, with General Motors. A regime decision to spend more
than $300 million on the CIPP benefits GM, but the decision siphoned off
•.,_.~ .... -~.-:.•• - -~ .-~ --'. ..: -- ~ • -":\ .~J •• -.,. .- ...~:. _....
Economic Development Administration grants, state loans and loan
guarantees, and Michigan Department of Transportation grants. Trying to
unearth the final public cost of the CIP Project is an exercise in futility.
Because of outstanding loans and unsettled lawsuits the exact final cost is not
yet available and, due to budgeting and accounting gymnastics within various
city departments, the current cost of the CIP Project is undiscemible. This
according to Ravitz (1992), Bruhn (1991), and Lowe (1991). A fascinating
research project--if it would be allowed--would be to trace the threads of local,
state and federal money through the project web to arrive at the public
expenditure. One might conclude from such a convoluted financial picture
that "total project cost" is not a number the Young administralion wants
published.
29
Mid-American Review of Sociology
neighborhood redevelopment funds for at least a decade because of loan and bond
obligations guaranteed by and payable from CDBG funds.
At some level, the city as a whole benefitted even if only symbolically, but
hundred.s of Poletown residents lost their homes. The city paid for relocation,
but family and neighborhood traditions were forfeited. The new Cadillac plant
eventually provided some jobs, but thousands of other auto workers in the city
subsequently lost their jobs as part of GM's reindustriaJization program. There is
a three percent city income tax, halved for those who work in the city and live
elsewhere, but there was an eventual net loss in income tax revenues because of
subsequent plant closings. GM pays only half of the properly tax assessment
for twelve years and property tax revenue was lost on demolished homes in
Poletown and declined on those area properties remaining (Ravitz, 1992; Bruhn,
1991). In hearings and public meetings GM officials and Emmett Moten of the
Community and Economic Development Department frequently alluded to
"6,000 jobs" at the CIPP. CEDD's analysis suggested that the CIPP made
sound economic sense if the new plan operated with two full shifts and
maintained backfill operations at the nearby Fleetwood and Clark Assembly
plants.9 Up to 20,000 spin-off jobs were projected.
The only promised benefit of the new plant was jobs. According to GM's
public relations office, the plant ran two shifts until early 1987 when layoffs
eventually totalling 2,000 workers began. In early 1992, 2,800 auto workers ran
one shift; a second shift, eventually recalling 1,000-1,500 workers will be
phased in by the summer of 1993. All of the employees at the CIPP are
transfers from the Fleetwood and Clark Assembly plants (the latter of which
closed before the Poletown plant began production and idled 15,000 workers) and
a small limo operation. The minimum seniority held by these UAW employees
is fifteen years with GM. About forty percent of the elP plant employees live
in the city of Detroit (Sylvester, 1992). Councilmember Ravitz calculates the
total project cost between $250 and $300 million. The number of jobs at the
Poletown plant has never reached the 6,000 jobs promised. With 4,800 jobs -
),920 held by Detroit residents - the cost per resident job is $156,250 (Ravitz,
,1988). Even if "economic conditions" are somehow used to justify this project,
the 'beiiefiCiaries 'oJ tnt'elt'P-are not Detroit's poor or Detroit's 'neighbor-floods.
Some observers take a long and optimistic gaze into the future and contend that
the Poletown plant will emerge as one of the future flagships of GM's
downsizing effort. If so, Detroit could yet reap real benefits from the project.
9. See David Fasenfest (1986) for a thorough discussion of the shortcomings of
using benefit and cost analysis as the sole determinant of economic
development policy.
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THE NEW CENTER AREA
Detroit's New Center area, the second project considered in this study, is
home to the corporate headquarters of the General Motors Corporation. 10
Despite a general decline in the area since the 1960s~ GM made a commitment to
stay and invested $35 million in building and facilities renovation during, the
early seventies. Beginning in 1977, GM embarked on a $1.25 million landscape
beautification project including the construction of two mini-parks. GM then
looked to the residential neighborhood north of its corporate facilities and sought
ways to revitalize the area. A consulting finn recommended a comprehensive
community development program. Features included a major private thrust into
housing rehabilitation, the creation of a framework in which area businesses and
institutions, the lending community, government, and citizen groups could
participate, and finn joint public/private commitments. General Motors wanted
to improve the neighborhood, spur redevelopment in Detroit and create a model
for redevelopment (Gregory, 1989).
GM was not being entirely altruistic as the cost of revitalizing the area is
minute compared to the cost of relocating the corporate headquarters operation.
Although the GM investment totals nearly $20 million, the city contributed
$4.9 million to New Center Area residential redevelopment in the early eighties
via Urban Development Action Grants and a portion of the Community
Development Block Grant. State housing funds were also made available to
subsidize construction and rental of low income family housing and the
apartments for senior citizens. Public and private forces were needed to address a
plethora of problems in the area, including the effects of redlining, excessive
traffic, poor planning, uncoordinated zoning changes, governmental neglect,
racial prejudice, absentee slum lords, drug addiction, and a concentration of the
poor, the elderly, and the mentally ill.
With images of Poletown still fresh, city officials hoped to circumvent any
opposition to the New Center project related to displacing area residents. One of
GM's consultants (Gladstone, 1988) warned that displacement can become an
explosive community issue, jeopardizing program success and tarnishing the
image of the developers,...Onjt~.UDAG .application. the city's Communityand
Economic Development Department (CEDD) claimed there would be no
displacement .of residents by the city, implicitly blaming GM (Cunningham,
1989); and GM's Development Corporation contended they were merely
rehabilitating vacant structures and building new structures on city-owned vacant
land, implicitly laying displacement at the city's feet. City Council's City
Planning Commission accused the GM proposal of displacing an entire
community of people (Brownell, 1978) and GM's own project report
10. The General Motors headquarters building is not located downtown, but in
the New Center Area, approximately three miles from the Detroit's
downtown and riverfront area.
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acknowledges the displacement of nearly three hundred tenants. Community
groups joined in an outcry against GM and CEDD demanding redress for the
displacement, and the protests proved advantageous to at least some o.f those
displaced. To settle the issue - not to stop displacement, but to alleviate the
resistance - CEDD added $800,000 to the UDAG to fund a tenant relocation
program. The developmentco~ration ~Iso added apartment housingfor seni~r
citizens and low-income family hOUSIng to plans for the area, grvmg this
redevelopment an income mix seldom occun:in~ in such projects. Th~se
additional expenditures were not made at GM's Insistence, but because the city
addressed civic concernson behalfor insteadof GeneralMotors.
The New Center Area is a twenty-two block redevelopment just north of
GM's world headquarters building. New Center Commons, the residential
component, includes forty-eight .single fa~ily ho~s~ng units,. forty-seven
condominium units, fifty-four units of family subsidized housing, and two
hundred apartments for senior citizens. The latter two components are a clear
divergence from other urban redevelopment projects which are, typically, the
exclusive province of at least upper middle income hous~holds.. Concurrent
redevelopment has also occurred in the form of office, retail, parking and hotel
development. ArgonautRealty targeted whitecollar employees at GM, the Henry
Ford Medical Center, Wayne State University, and Unisys Corporation with its
first sales blitz; to their disappointment, and implicitly to GM's, few auto
executivesrelocated to NewCenter Commons.
Summary Observations
Decisions about economic redevelopment in Detroit are made by an urban
regimecomprisedof the mayorand persons holding key organizational positions
in the elite business community. A Jist of regime members parallels the
membership list of the Economic Development Corporation and th~ Detroit
Economic Growth Corporation along with Coleman Young and the director of
the Communityand EconomicDevelopment Department.
The EconomicDevelopmentCorporation and the Detroit Economic Growth
Corporation have s..tan~di!lg ..in... the-:.p<!Jittcat;p~p~~~~..;..... f~!l~HQn...a!1.~, the,
commercial and industrial interests represented have a legitimate role In the
regime. It is, however, unlikely that redevelopment decisions in D~t.roit w~uld
bedifferent if there were not an EDe or the DEGC. Although decisions might
be less expeditiously made, bargaining about planning and funding large capil~1
projects would engage similar key business leaders and the mayor. The stat.e I.n
general is dependent on the investment accumulation process and Detroit IS
certainly no exception. . .
Development policy is inextricably connected with Issues abo~t who
benefitsand who bears the cost. The decision to fund the Central Industnat Park
Project was primarily shaped by GM, Mayor Young, and the Detroit Economic
Growth Corporation. Minor roles were allowed the City Council, the Poletown
Neighborhood Council, the United Auto Workers, the Michigan Legislature, and
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other activists. Similarly, GM, the DEGC, and thecity made the only decisions
that mattered concerning redevelopment in the NewCenter Area. The burden of
cost was assignedaccording to the relative bargaining positionof each actor and
some actors re~eived few benefits. Fasenfest says it most succinctly, "The
people of the city of Detroit assumed all the expenses and took all the risks"
(Fasenfest, 1986: 114).
While the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation laid aside its downtown
emphasis, the group was instrumental in coordinating funds for the New Center
Commons development. OM relied on an in-house fiduciary agent, Argonaut
Realty, to purchase options on properties and eventually offer renovated houses
for sal~ on the real estate market (Spreitzer-Berent, 1989). .The public
~xpendltures were primarily for relocation assistance, street, and lighting
Improvements. As with the CIP Project the policy impacts of the New Center
redevelopments varied according to one's perspective. In purely physical terms,
t~e GM developments were progressive. The area is cleaner, the city reaps
higher property tax revenues, and the image of slum neighborhoods has
disappeared. However, the former residents, many of whom were low income
single adults and African Americans, lost their homes. GM's worldheadquaners
facility remains, but few GM employees moved into New Center Commons
housing. Key factors contributing to the success of this project were support
from the Young administration, the availability of financing, enough renovated
housing units to generate market momentum, and well planned and executed
marketingstrategies. Many political and economic interests are manifest.
Economic actors bring tremendous strength to the bargaining table. They
have resources,jobs - real and promised, and mobilecapital. Detroit'spolitical
actors bring a city full of needs: jobs, housing, social services, simple
necessities. They also have economic incentives: tax abatements, special tax
districts, land, CDBG funds, and the ability to leverage and package limited state
and federal funds. What Detroit wants is real or at least symbolic redevelopment:
someone building something, fifty or a hundred newjobs. If political actors do
not facilitate economicdevelopment, economic actorssimply leave town.
Much as the image of a growth machine seems forced in Detroit. the public-
~'_. .spiritedness of the Atlanta regime does not' fiteither, There is not aii"honesf' #"
sense of working for the common good, but the image of mayor who mouths
these words while participating in regime decisions. Detroit's government more
closely resembles Elkin's assessment of Dallas' government: the business elite
maintain a political system "in which those who hold elected and appointed
office do not have to be told what to do" (Elkin, 1987b:30).
From a socio-political standpoint, in a city as desperately poor as Detroit, it
seems unconscionable that the mayor aggressively courtscorporate interests and
investment with public funds. Destroying Poletown for even 4,800 GM jobs
and assisting in the gentrification of the New Center Area seem incongruous
with Detroit's needs for basic shelter and employmentfor many residents. In his
defense, the mayor is neither an independentnor an isolated leader. As an elected
political leader, Young dispenses benefits to community organizations and
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neighborhoods. From a regime view, Young fulfills the responsibility of his
political position - his power role in the regime - by compressing public
resources into economic redevelopment projects consequently directly benefitting .
members of the regime who hold economic power. Detroit is a city with few
options, so it may be unduly harsh to judge Mayor Young by the same political
and economic standards as one might use in Dallas or Phoenix or San Diego.
He does what he does to generate jobs in desperate times. He pursues economic
development while concurrently making both the neighborhoods and developers
beholden to him. However insignificant two thousand jobs and a few dozen
homes are in the big picture, the Central Industrial Park Project and the New
Center Area redevelopments benefit GM and improve, however slightly, the
business climate in Detroit.
Detroit is also the center of one of America's most segregated regions. If
Detroit and its suburbs are to succeed and compete globally, regional economic
initiatives may be necessary. There are two regional groups which merit"
mention both because of their activities and because the Detroit regime no doubt
responds to their suggestions. The Southeast Michigan Council of
Governments has promulgated a Regional Development Initiative which is large
and long term in scope. There is also a group called the Six Pack (comprised of
Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties, the City of Detroit, the Michigan
Departments of Commerce and Transportation). This informal group provides
advice on regional planning and development policies.
Young's part in the regime may be as a minor player in a bigger game, and
even the Detroit regime is subject to pressures which emerge and prevail far
beyond the city limits. In the capitalist state, the political system and the
economic system are inseparable and symbiotic, but economic interests are
paramount. The regime's imprimatur on the Central Industrial Park and the New
Center Area is different only in degree when compared to Kentucky's largess
toward Toyota or Indiana's accommodation of Isuzu. Rule I of the capitalist
bargain is that economic interests win. Rule 2 is that cities and states must
somehow abide by Rule J.
We conclude that Detroit and similarly distressed cities are indeed limited,
~.. ~ ._.~r.b~~A~ye])....mQ~. than Peterson imagined. They~re ~.o;gstt;.~in~d,~.by.d~cllniqg..~
economic resources, land area, and the existence of contentious urban regimes
which exist in a larger network of state, national, and international political and
economic actors. In that context, demolition of a neighborhood or displacement
of a few dozen residents pale when juxtaposed against international competition
for economic resources, development, and jobs. City officials and their
development options are limited by - even captives of - economic elites
whose interests often lie far beyond the city's boundaries.
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